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We use a combination of administrative and survey data to estimate the fraction of individuals newly
enrolled in public health coverage (Wisconsin’s combined Medicaid and CHIP program) that had access
to private, employer-sponsored health insurance at the time of their enrollment and the fraction that
dropped this coverage. We estimate that after expansion of eligibility for public coverage, approximately
20% of new enrollees had access to private health insurance at the time of enrollment and that only
8% dropped this coverage (with the remaining 12% having both private and public coverage).  We
also identify an “upper bound” estimate, which suggests that the percentage of new enrollees with
private insurance coverage at the time of enrollment is, at most, 27%.  These estimates of crowd-out
are relatively low compared with estimates from the literature based on Medicaid and CHIP expansions,
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1.  Introduction 
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is expected to increase 
health insurance coverage largely through expansions to Medicaid (CBO, 2009).  The extent of 
declines in uninsured rates depends on the target efficiency of the Medicaid expansions —that is, 
the percentage of individuals that are newly covered by public programs that previously had 
private insurance. Reductions in the number of uninsured individuals may not be the only 
objective of expansions in eligibility for public insurance, as some programs also seek to 
improve the quality of coverage in terms of benefits and affordability (Dorn, 2011).  But the 
policy debate continues to focus on the degree to which expansions efficiently reach the 
uninsured, and do not promote substitution of public coverage for private.  
To date, the economics literature has provided a wide range of estimates of crowd-out, 
measuring the percentage of newly eligible public insurance enrollees that would have otherwise 
held private insurance.  These estimates vary because of differing methods, data, and time 
periods or programs that have been examined.  A summary of the literature produced the oft-
cited assertion that the crowd-out rate associated with previous public health insurance program 
expansions in the U.S. lies between 25 and 50% (CBO, 2007).   
Our paper contributes to this literature on the crowd-out of private coverage from public 
health insurance program expansions in two ways.  First, we use longitudinal administrative data 
from Wisconsin’s public health insurance programs (called BadgerCare Plus, or BC+) that 
covers the period from January 2006 to November 2009 during which the program was 
expanded.  Administrative data have many advantages relative to survey data when tracking 
public program enrollment. We observe the universe of enrollees in public coverage as well as 
their families. We can directly observe the private insurance status for the length of enrollment 
for almost 90% of enrollees, and for the remainder (who are at self-insured firms) we are able to Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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impute coverage status.  The use of administrative data in this study allows us to accurately 
capture movements between private and public coverage for individuals who enroll in public 
coverage, which has not been previously possible. We are also able to observe work transitions 
that may be associated with losses of coverage.  The size of our administrative sample also 
allows us to examine crowd-out rates by subgroup, including age, income, and geographic 
location.  To our knowledge, no previous study has used administrative databases to estimate the 
prior private insurance coverage of enrollees into public coverage.   
Second, the expansion in public coverage we examine is to populations that are not 
typically covered by Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).  Thus, the 
estimates we provide of the proportion of enrollees into BC+ that previously held private 
insurance will be informative as Medicaid expansions move forward under national health 
reform. Specifically, we study an elimination of income limits for children’s coverage, the 
expansion of income eligibility of parents and caretaker adults from 185% and 44% of the 
federal poverty level (FPL), respectively, up to 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL), subject 
to some restrictions regarding insurance status, and a complete lifting of any crowd-out-related 
restrictions for those below 150% FPL.  While the majority of the population made newly 
eligible under the BC+ reforms had higher incomes than the population slated to become 
Medicaid-eligible under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), the BC+ 
crowd-out estimates remain relevant to the current national debate. First, the great majority of the 
newly enrolled populations in BC+ had incomes under 150% FPL, closely mirroring the likely 
ACA expansion population. Moreover, the maintenance of effort requirements put in place with 
ACA’s passage – requiring states to at minimum uphold current Medicaid eligibility levels – 
have come under fire by some state officials hoping to cut Medicaid costs by eliminating Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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eligibility for relatively higher-income populations (Serafini and Appleby 2011; Solomon 2011). 
Understanding the prevalence of crowd-out for the subgroup of higher-income BC+ enrollees 
should inform what could be a perennially contentious national debate.   
Our results suggest that far fewer individuals were displaced from private coverage than 
generally thought.  We find an overall crowd-out rate of 19.9%, measured as the fraction of 
enrollees who had private coverage at the time of enrollment between April 2008 and November 
2009.  This rate is much lower than most estimates in the literature on the CHIP-era expansions.  
Our results indicate that higher-income individuals are more likely to have private insurance, 
consistent with the literature.  However, even among enrollees with incomes of over 300% FPL, 
we find an estimate of 37.0% on this measure of crowd-out.  When we use the longitudinal 
nature of our data to consider as crowded-out only those individuals who dropped their private 
insurance within six months of enrollment, we find an overall rate of 8.4% and only 20.0% in the 
highest income eligibility brackets.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the established methods for 
understanding and measuring crowd-out and how our approach fits in to this context.  Section 3 
describes the unique combination of administrative and survey data sources we use for our 
analysis.  Section 4 specifies the methods we use to measure crowd-out and section 5 presents 
our results.  Finally, section 6 discusses the implications of our results for policy and our 
conclusions. 
 
2.  Background  
Interest in the potential displacement of private insurance coverage by public health  
programs increased with the expansions of state Medicaid programs in the late 1980s and early Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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1990s.  Traditionally, Medicaid coverage had been tied to eligibility for AFDC cash assistance, 
but the 1996 welfare reform law and expansion in Medicaid eligibility severed this link and 
allowed family types and income categories that were not necessarily welfare eligible to gain 
public health insurance coverage.  Enrollment in public health insurance programs grew 
significantly with these changes, raising concerns among some policy-makers about the extent to 
which public coverage was substituting for, or “crowding out,” private health insurance.   
Crowd-out occurs when private insurance coverage is lower than it would have been in 
the absence of the public program- for example, if people substitute public for private coverage 
or employers reduce their insurance offerings  If people would otherwise have become 
uninsured, enrolling in a public program does not constitute crowd-out. 
Early work by Cutler and Gruber (1996) measures crowd-out occurring in response to the 
Medicaid expansions targeting poor younger children during the years 1987 and 1992.  They use 
state variation in eligibility (due to variation in policy implementation), cross-sectional data from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), and an instrumental variable framework (where simulated 
eligibility based on the state-level eligibility rates using a national sample serves as the 
instrument for actual eligibility), and conclude that the crowd-out rate was approximately 50%.  
This paper spurred a large literature on crowd-out in public health insurance programs, 
much of which found considerably lower crowd-out rates (examples include Blumberg, Dubay, 
and Norton 2000; Dubay and Kenney 1996; Shore-Sheppard 1996; Shore-Sheppard 2008; and 
Yazici and Kaestner 2000).  Gruber and Simon (2008) trace the evolution of the crowd-out 
literature in the decade following Cutler and Gruber (1996), noting the large range of crowd-out 
estimates.  They explain this range as due to wide variation in estimation methodologies, data 
types and even the particular computation of the crowd-out measure. CBO (2007) reviewed the Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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literature on crowd-out from CHI-era (generally defined as 1997-2002) expansions, which 
targeted near-poor children of all ages, and concluded that the crowd-out rate from these later 
expansions was between 25 and 50%. 
Here we focus the relative contribution of our work given that our methodology is 
substantially different. First, the definition of the crowd-out rate itself is an important point of 
departure.    Cutler and Gruber (1996) identify two approaches to computing it:  the ratio of the 
average change in private coverage to the change in public coverage, or one minus the ratio of 
the change in the uninsured to the change in public coverage.  The two measures differ because 
some people report having both private and public coverage.  The treatment of this overlap is an 
important source of differences in estimates.
2  The overlap is sometimes thought of as a 
measurement issue:  either a reporting error on the part of survey recipients or an issue of timing 
(those who moved from one source of coverage to the other report having both).  We have an 
alternative explanation:  we observe that 11.7% of BagerCare enrollees in fact maintain some 
form of private insurance coverage for at least a significant portion of their enrollment period.  
Because of this, we think that the overlap population should be treated as a true overlap in 
coverage.  Here, we report two measures of crowd-out:  first, the percentage of new Medicaid 
enrollees who had private insurance at the time of enrollment; and second, the percentage of 
those enrollees who dropped their private insurance within six months of enrollment.
3   
Second, crowd-out estimates are sensitive to the data source, especially the use of cross-
sectional or panel data.  In general, papers that use panel data have found lower rates of crowd-
out.   Cross-sectional data, specifically the often-used CPS, suffer from unclear timing (whether 
the respondent refers to coverage in the past year, as asked, or current coverage).  Longitudinal 
                                                            
2 For example, Lee et al. (2008) find no crowd-out using the first approach, but 40% using the second. 
3 GAO (2006) also found that a substantial amount of Medicaid enrollees also had private coverage.  Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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surveys like the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), another common data 
source in this literature, have the strength of allowing researchers to observe changes in 
insurance coverage over time.  However, most panel data sets, including the SIPP, have 
comparatively smaller sample sizes and are not designed to be representative at the state level.  
Administrative data do not suffer from issues of sample size, representativeness, or timing, but 
have not generally been used in this literature.  We found just two studies linked to 
administrative data: Sommers et al. (2007) and Shone et al. (2008). Both use responses to 
parental surveys for which potential respondents were randomly drawn from administrative 
records.  Both studies report a ratio of change in private coverage to public coverage of 28% 
when all changes in private coverage are factored into the measure.  Sommers et al. also report a 
“substitution” estimate across ten states of approximately 14% when the numerator excludes 
cases where coverage is dropped or lost due to changes in employment circumstances impacting 
coverage, or changes in family circumstances.   
Third, methodological differences produce variation in estimation outcomes. Both Dubay 
and Kenney (2009) and Gruber and Simon (2008) compute a range of estimates using different 
strategies.  Both produce estimates derived under both the instrumental variable and difference-
in-differences estimation approaches. Using the National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF), 
Dubay and Kenney report 33% - 43% crowd-out estimates for children’s coverage. Gruber and 
Simon find 30%-60% using the SIPP.  Yazici and Kaestner (2000) provide one careful 
discussion of the impacts of different methodologies and the assumptions required for their 
validity.  A particular strength of our data source is that it allows us to abstract from differences 
in methodology and identification issues through direct measurement.  We also provide Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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alternative estimates using a difference-in-differences methodology and CPS data to contrast 
with our results. 
 
3. Data  
We use two very different sources of data in this paper:  administrative records covering the 
universe of Medicaid enrollees in Wisconsin and cross-sectional survey data representative of the 
Wisconsin population.  Here, we describe them in turn. 
A.  Administrative Data 
The main data source is administrative enrollment records from the state of Wisconsin’s 
Medicaid and CHIP programs.  These records were made available to us as a part of an 
evaluation of a state health reform, which occurred in February 2008.  The reform, known as 
BadgerCare Plus or BC+, expanded on BadgerCare (Wisconsin’s CHIP and Medicaid).  BC+ 
combined its predecessor programs into one umbrella program. The introduction of BC+ was 
characterized by the following elements: eligibility expansions; simplification of eligibility rules 
and enrollment and verification processes; and an aggressive marketing and outreach campaign. 
Leininger et al. (2011) provide a more in-depth analysis of the BC+ reform and its impacts on 
enrollment and exit rates.   
Most important for our purposes were two changes.  First, eligibility criteria were 
changed for children and parents.  BC+ eliminated the income eligibility ceiling for children, 
which was previously at 200% FPL. BC+ also expanded the definition of parental eligibility to 
include low-income caretaker relatives.
4  Second, restrictions designed to discourage crowd-out 
were completely lifted for all enrollees under 150% FPL.  Prior to the launch of BC+, anti-
                                                            
4 Later changes in BC+ expanded coverage to adults without dependent children with incomes of up to 200% FPL. 
They are excluded from this analysis. Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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crowd-out provisions were applied in the BadgerCare program but not in the Medicaid program. 
Under BC+, applicants with incomes over 150% FPL are subject to anti-crowd-out provisions. 
With good-cause exceptions
5, these individuals face a three month waiting period for dropped 
coverage and must have no previous offer of employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) during the past 
12 months, nor have the opportunity to enroll in ESI in during the upcoming three 3 months. The 
employer must cover at least 80% of the premium for the crowd-out provisions to apply.  
   Reform resulted in a significant increase in enrollment:  enrollment of children in BC+ 
increased by approximately 23,000 people (7%), and enrollment of adults increased by 28,000 
(16%) in February 2008 alone.  From April 2008 on, net enrollment increased on average by 
more than 5,000 people per month. 
 For our analysis of crowd-out, we construct a longitudinal administrative dataset from four 
administrative databases: 
  CARES: Wisconsin’s program eligibility database; 
  UI: Unemployment Insurance and quarterly wage records; 
  TPL:  Wisconsin’s Third Party Liability database; and 
  DOL:  a U.S. Department of Labor database of all self-insured firms. 
 
The unit of observation in this dataset is an individual-month beginning in the first month 
that individual enrolled in BC+ between January 2006 and May 2009.
6 We link across these 
different sources by using Social Security numbers (SSNs) and federal employer identification 
numbers (FEINs). 
Data on BC+ enrollees were drawn from the Wisconsin enrollment eligibility database 
system, called CARES, from January 2006 to November 2009.  For some of the analysis, we use 
                                                            
5 Good cause exemptions include 
6 We include only new enrollees; all of the enrollees in January 2006 are left-censored, so we cannot observe the 
start-date of their spells.  We exclude these censored observations from our analysis.  We use the panel nature of the 
data to look six months ahead at private status, so although the data go through November 2009, the last new spells 
we include are those beginning in May 2009. Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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data from other case members; a case includes all individuals associated with eligibility 
determination (generally, everyone in the applicant’s household).  Over this time period, we have 
monthly enrollment data for a total of 1,392,185 enrollees in 433,525 unique cases.  CARES also 
contains demographic and income information, including age, sex, ethnicity, citizenship, 
educational attainment, and income sources.  From the income data, we are able to observe 
whether the main source of income for a case is self-employment. 
Individuals are matched to the TPL database using their SSNs.  TPL is an individual-
level database that contains all enrollees in state health insurance programs who are covered by a 
private fully-insured health insurance plan. This database, while an excellent resource for our 
study on crowd-out, is limited in two ways.  First, the database does not contain individuals who 
are covered by health insurance provided by a self-funded employer (whose policies are not 
subject to state regulation). Second, these data are available for each month in which an 
individual is enrolled in BC+, but do not contain information on the health insurance coverage of 
individuals in months prior to enrollment or following disenrollment.  Those enrollees who do 
not have insurance according to the TPL database either do not have private insurance or have 
health insurance through a self-funded employer. 
To assess whether enrollees may have access to health insurance coverage through a self-
funded employer, we connect BC+ cases to their set of employers by linking CARES through 
SSNs to a database of quarterly earnings records from Wisconsin’s unemployment insurance 
(UI) system.   Almost all employers are required to file quarterly wage reports for each employee 
on the payroll in case of later unemployment claims. The wage reports include the employee’s 
SSN and quarterly wages and the employer’s FEIN and industry classification code.   Only Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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employers not subject to unemployment insurance laws are exempt from reporting.
7  Employers 
who are exempt from UI reporting (such as independent contractors) are highly unlikely to be 
self-insured. Since our enrollment data is monthly, we assign enrollees to a firm in each month 
within the quarter in which we observe them in UI.  Those who work at multiple firms are 
assigned the FEIN of the employer from which they earned the most in wages.  The UI data are 
available for all workers in CARES both prior to and post enrollment, enabling us to identify 
workers who had a job loss at the time of enrollment.  Of the 433,525 cases in our sample, 
286,352 cases have a member that also appears in the UI database.  That is, 66% of our cases 
have a member who was employed by a UI reporting firm.    
Next, for those who do not have a TPL match, we use FEINs (obtained from UI) to link 
to data from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), in order to see if a BC+ case member’s 
employer offers a self-funded plan.  We obtained these data through a Freedom of Information 
Act request.  The data represent the universe of employers within the United States from 2003-
2007 that are self-insured for health, life, and disability and related insurance plans.  These data 
are used to administer ERISA, and are acquired as part of the required reporting of self-insured 
firms to the Internal Revenue Service.  Because we are unable to observe which members of a 
case with a DOL match obtain their health insurance from the self-insured firm, we make the 
relevant assumptions discussed below in Section 4 regarding self-insured status for all members. 
Our results are not sensitive to this assumption.  In the data, we match roughly 10% of enrollees 
to a DOL firm. 
For much of the analysis, we separate the data into three time periods:  pre-reform 
(January 2006 to January 2008), transitional (February and March 2008), and post-reform (April 
                                                            
7 In general, WI employers are subject to UI liability if they pay $1,500 or more in wages in any calendar quarter or 
have full or part-time employees working for them in 20 weeks or more during a calendar year. Special rules apply 
for agriculture, non-profit firms, and employers of domestic service workers. Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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2008 to November 2009).  We do this for several reasons.  First, it allows us to compare pre and 
post reform, although the recession, which began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009 
confounds causal inference.  Second, we separate the transitional period because we are 
concerned that these initial enrollees are different.  We know that a group of nearly 50,000 
eligible parents and siblings of current program enrollees were automatically enrolled in the 
program in February 2008, many of whom already had private health insurance. We can identify 
these in the data and examine them separately below.  A bigger concern is the possibility that 
initial program enrollees behaved strategically in waiting to enroll on Medicaid until after the 
reform had been implemented (because of different cost-sharing provisions, for example).  
Finally, it is important when analyzing crowd-out by income group because not all groups were 
eligible for the entire time period. 
 Means of some variables in the combined data are listed in Table 1.   Most notably, the 
youngest child in the family is under 5 for nearly half of our sample.  Almost the entire sample 
consists of cases under 150% FPL; as discussed above, much of the new enrollment occurred in 
populations that were income-eligible even prior to reform. Very few households earn a majority 
of their income from self-employment (the definition we use for self-employed), although many 
appear to be full-time workers.  We define full- or part-time status by imputation: we compare a 
worker’s quarterly earnings with what they could expect to earn working full-time (35 hours) at 
minimum wage; workers below that level were considered part-time.
8   
A minor issue involves the usage of FEINs to link data from different sources.  FEINs are 
issued by the Internal Revenue Service for payroll tax reporting.  Although a FEIN is unique to a 
firm, firms can have more than one FEIN if they have more than one location or operate under 
                                                            
8 Previous work found that wage and hours worked information from CARES to be of low quality relative to UI 
information.  See Wolfe et al. (2006).  Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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different names.  For single-unit firms (which have only one establishment), there is a one-to-one 
relationship between the firm and the FEIN.  However, multi-unit firms can have more than one 
FEIN, such as chain stores, although each establishment can be associated with only one FEIN.  
Because the UI system sometimes cross-verifies data with the IRS, we are confident that FEINs 
used in the DOL and UI data are correctly matched.  Additionally, for a small sample of 
employers (including one retail chain, one company that owned several chains in the same 
industry, and one major manufacturer), we were able to directly verify that the FEINs that were 
submitted to UI and DOL were identical and accurately represented who owned the 
responsibility for the insurance offer. 
B.  Survey Data 
We use two sources of survey data in this paper: the Wisconsin Family Health Survey 
(FHS) and the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS).  We 
use both the FHS and the CPS to predict the probability of having private health insurance for 
enrollees with a family member employed by a firm with a self-funded plan. We also use the 
CPS in our difference-in-difference models of crowd-out.   
The 2007-2009 March CPS data have 11,418 Wisconsin respondents in total.
9  Our 
analytical sample consists of employed men and women who are 18 to 65 years old.   We further 
limit our sample to those living with at least one under-aged child in the family in order to mimic 
the Medicaid eligibility criteria in Wisconsin, yielding an analytical sample of 2,685 men and 
women.
10   The health insurance question in the CPS asks about coverage sources in the previous 
year. 
                                                            
9 Our difference-in-difference models include the 2010 CPS. 
10 We only consider those workers who were living in a family (defined by CPS) in which at least one relative child 
(that is, under 18 years old) was present.  Workers who were in families without any related child or who were 
living alone with unrelated children were excluded from our analysis.  For multiple-family households, the workers Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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The FHS is a yearly phone survey of households in Wisconsin that includes questions 
about health status, behaviors, health services, and insurance.  It also contains information on 
demographics and income. We use a question in the FHS that asks about current health insurance 
coverage to construct the dependent variable.  The 2007 and 2008 FHS data have 5,161 
respondents in total. We restrict the sample to households headed by workers aged 18-65 and 
that have one or more children, leaving us with 2,016 observations.  Appendix Table A1 contains 
descriptive statistics of the sample populations from the CPS and the FHS. 
 
4. Methods 
  The following section outlines our approach to answering our research questions:  
(1) What is the percentage of new enrollees in public insurance with private insurance 
coverage at the time of enrollment?  
(2) What is the percentage of these new enrollees that dropped their private coverage soon 
after enrolling?   
We discuss our methods for obtaining point estimates and upper-bound estimates of these 
percentages. We also discuss our use of a difference-in-differences estimation approach using 
survey data, while highlighting the discrepancies between this method and our administrative 
data estimation strategy.   
  A. Estimates of the Percentage of Enrollees with Private Health Insurance Coverage 
We begin by estimating the percentage of individuals that are covered by private, 
employer sponsored health insurance (ESI) at the time of enrollment.  We will refer to this 
quantity as P(ESI | enroll) or more simply, P(ESI). We break this probability into two pieces: the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
who were in unrelated sub-families but had no related child in his/her own family would not be included in our 
sample.   Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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probability that the enrollee had ESI from a fully-insured firm and the probability that the 
individual has ESI from a self-insured firm.   
P(ESI) = P(ESI at fully-insured firm) + P(ESI at self-insured firm)  
  The probability of having ESI at a self-insured firm is given by the probability of having 
health insurance given that a member of the case is employed at a self-insured firm multiplied by 
the probability of employment at such a firm: 
P(ESI at self-funded firm) = P(ESI at self-insured firm| Employed at self-insured firm) 
            x P(Employed at self-insured firm) 
We assume that the probability of having ESI at a self-insured firm is zero for those without a 
case member who is employed at a self-insured firm: 
P(ESI at self-insured firm | Not employed at self-insured firm) = 0 
While this is not literally true because of the availability of retiree health insurance and COBRA, 
estimates from the CPS suggest that the number of people who obtain such coverage is very low. 
Thus, the probability of having ESI is given by: 
(1)       P(ESI) = P(ESI at fully-insured firm)  
       + P(ESI at self-insured firm| Employed at self-insured firm) 
            x P(Employed at self-insured firm). 
Our strategy is to estimate each piece of equation (1) to estimate the probability that a 
new enrollee in BC+ was covered by ESI at the time of enrollment.  We do this by first 
calculating whether an enrollee was covered by an insurance plan in TPL in the month of 
enrollment.  We then determine the percentage of enrollees with case members who are 
employed at firms with self-funded plans. Finally, we estimate the probability of having ESI Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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conditional on having a case member employed at a firm with a self-funded plan using survey 
data. 
We first calculate a point estimate of the percentage of BC+ enrollees with a case 
member employed by a firm with a self-funded plan that were covered by that plan. We do this 
by using the DOL administrative data files to determine whether a case member is employed at a 
self-insured firm.  We then estimate the probability of their being offered health insurance using 
survey data.  To do this, we estimate probit models where the dependent variable is an indicator 
for employment-based health insurance coverage of the highest-earning worker. We use the 
2007-2009 March CPS and 2007-2008 Wisconsin FHS to estimate the predicted probabilities 
that new BC+ enrollees will have ESI.  Both the CPS and FHS contain information on insurance 
coverage for all household members. We then predict these probabilities over each new enrollee 
with a case member who is employed at a self-funded firm and take the average predicted 
probability for each group as the conditional probability.  Details of these models and their 
results are reported in the Appendix. 
We also employ an “upper-bound” approach that makes more conservative assumptions. 
In it, we assume that any enrollee with a case member employed at a large, self-funded firm has 
ESI coverage.  That is, we assume: 
(2)  P(ESI at self-insured firm| Employed at self-insured firm) = 1. 
We consider this method an “upper-bound” estimate because it represents the maximum possible 
take-up of coverage by workers at self-insured firms.  Some employees at firms that offer health 
insurance are themselves not eligible for health insurance either because they work part-time, are 
in occupations that are not covered, or have not been at the firm for a sufficient period of time.  
For example, Farber and Levy (1998) report that in 1997, only 91 percent of workers in firms Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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that offered health insurance were eligible for coverage.  The bulk of those workers who were 
ineligible for health insurance were part-time workers.  
B.  Estimates of the Percentage of New Enrollees who Drop Private Coverage 
Not every person with private health insurance at the time of enrollment in public 
programs will drop that coverage. Many BC+ enrollees who have private insurance at the time of 
enrollment are permitted or required to maintain their private coverage.  In such cases of dual 
coverage, BC+ is the payer of last resort.
11  Since these individuals do not drop their private 
insurance coverage in favor of public coverage, we most likely do not want to consider them as 
having been “crowded-out” in our estimates (although they may be making intensive margin 
adjustments by choosing less comprehensive coverage).   
To determine what percentage of enrollees had private coverage at the time of enrollment 
but subsequently dropped that coverage, we once again use the TPL database that collects 
information on all individuals with a private source of insurance in the state who are also 
enrolled in BC+.  The State collects these data so it can determine in which cases BC+ is the 
payer of last resort. We look forward seven months post-enrollment.  Those individuals who had 
coverage at the time of enrollment (month 1), but did not have it in any of the following six 
months (months 2 through 7) and were still enrolled in BC+ were considered as having dropped 
                                                            
11 This provision is not specific to Wisconsin. We reviewed the websites for each state program to determine which 
states allow their family and child program applicants to have dual coverage. Most states’ websites provided 
sufficient evidence to determine their dual coverage policy.  When this was not the case, we called the state’s CHIP 
program office directly for further information. Nine states allow some sort of dual coverage with their CHIP 
program: Alaska, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. These dual 
coverage programs range in breadth from allowing children/families with private insurance to be dually covered, 
with income restrictions (Alaska, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland South Dakota, and Wisconsin), to only allowing 
dual coverage in cases of underinsurance, again with income restrictions (Michigan and Oregon).  Conclusive 
evidence is lacking for seven states (D.C., Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, and Washington). 
These states’ websites are unclear on the subject of dual coverage and phone calls to get more information were 
unsuccessful. Thirty-four states do not allow any sort of dual coverage. That is, individuals must not have private 
coverage under any circumstances to be eligible for these programs. 
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their private coverage. In the case of spells shorter than 7 months, those that drop private 
coverage prior to disenrollment are counted. 
The longitudinal aspect of the UI data allows us to observe job loss and change among 
employees.  Newly enrolled cases with access to private coverage prior to BC+ enrollment, but 
who simultaneously lose their jobs likely should not be counted as having been “crowded-out.”
12 
We identify workers who experienced a job loss, defined as going from having a job match in the 
quarter of enrollment in BC+ to having no job match in the following quarter. We then assign 
these workers as not having dropped health insurance for the purposes of our estimation.   
C.  Estimates by Subgroup 
We estimate the percentages of enrollees who were covered by ESI at the time of 
enrollment at who subsequently dropped this coverage for a variety of sub-groups and time 
periods.  We examine three time periods – a pre-expansion period (January 2006-January 2008), 
an initial post-expansion period (February and March 2008), and a post-expansion period (April 
2008- November 2009) – and multiple income categories – above and below 150% FPL, 150-
200% FPL, 200%-300% FPL, and above 300% FPL. We also separately examined child and 
adult enrollees and residents of rural and urban counties.  We do not report separate results for 




12 We recognize the possibility that obtaining public coverage could in theory induce individuals to reduce their 
labor supply, which would result in our classifying intentional exits as job losses. Existing literature suggests that 
this is not a prevalent phenomenon (see, for example, Strumpf 2011). A more likely potential phenomenon is a 
switch to self-employment induced by receiving public coverage that results in the lack of a longitudinal match to 
the UI data. This phenomenon would suggest that we are misclassifying some intentional switches to self-
employment as job losses. However, it is debatable whether these switches should be counted in the crowd-out 
figures, given that being “job locked” in a position with health insurance coverage when one prefers to be self-
employed is widely considered to be welfare reducing (see, for example, Madrian 1994 and Monheit and Cooper 
1994). Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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D.  Estimating Substitution between Public and Private Insurance Using Survey Data  
  As discussed above, the vast majority of studies to date have used survey data to estimate 
the substitution of public coverage for private coverage or the extent to which public coverage 
crowds-out private coverage. These studies have predominantly used a difference-in-differences 
approach or a simulated instrumental variables approach. 
  We also use a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the extent of substitution 
between public and private health insurance in response to the large increase in BC+ enrollment 
that occurred following the February 2008 expansion of the program.  Compared to the analysis 
of nationwide expansions of either the Medicaid or CHIP programs, in which expansions were of 
different sizes and occurred at different times in different states, difference-in-differences is 
much less amenable to analyzing the recent Wisconsin expansion.  The reasons for this are: first, 
unlike in previous studies, there is only one expansion (Wisconsin in February 2008); and 
second, it is not clear what states would comprise an appropriate control group.  While previous 
studies have used difference-in-differences to analyze policy changes in a single state using 
neighboring states as a control (e.g., Card and Krueger 1994), this type of analysis can be 
problematic because of power and issues of internal validity.   
  Despite these potential limitations, we do this analysis to depict what one would find 
using difference-in-differences to analyze the Wisconsin expansion.  In particular, we use the 
CPS to estimate the change in public coverage and in private coverage before and after the 
expansion.  This approach is similar in concept to what has been previously estimated in the 
literature except in that it examines a single-state expansion. 
  We estimate the following linear probability models using data from the CPS from the 
survey years 2007-20010: Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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(3)                                                                 
where y is a dummy variable for health insurance status, Post is a dummy variable for 2009, WI 
is a dummy variable for Wisconsin, the treatment state, and X is a vector of controls.  We 
consider several different measures of health insurance.  These are:  
  (i) Public coverage (Medicaid/CHIP) or both private and public coverage;  
  (ii) Private Insurance coverage only; 
  (iii) Private insurance coverage or both private and public coverage; and 
  (iv) Uninsured.  
We also estimate this model for people of different income levels (0-150% FPL, 150-300%FPL, 
> 300% FPL).  We consider carefully the treatment of individuals with both private and public 
coverage because of the known importance of this issue in the literature. Our preferred 
specification counts those who report having both types of insurance in both categories. 
The proportion of individuals that may have dropped private insurance would be 
estimated by the ratio of the change in private coverage to the change in public coverage: 
     
  |        
  |       
 
Because macroeconomic trends during this time period would have, by themselves, led to an 
increase in public coverage and a decline in private coverage, we need to compare these trends 
with what happened in a set of control states.  The identifying assumption here is that the 
macroeconomic trends are the same in the control states as in the Wisconsin.   The control states 
we consider are (a) Minnesota, (b) Midwestern states excluding Wisconsin, and (c) the rest of the 
U.S. 
  




  We report the results of our analysis in this section.  First, we show our upper bound and 
point estimates of the percentage of enrollees with ESI coverage at the time of enrollment, 
obtained from the administrative data.  Second, we present our estimates of the percentage of 
enrollees who dropped private coverage.  Finally, we present the results based on survey data 
and difference-in-differences. 
 
A. Administrative Data Estimates of the Percentage with Private Insurance Coverage at 
the Time of Enrollment 
Overall, for all enrollees, we estimate that in the post-BadgerCare Plus expansion period 
(April 2008-November 2009), 19.9% of enrollees had private insurance coverage at the time of 
enrollment. The 95% confidence interval for this estimate is 18.7% to 21.0%.
13  Since this 
estimate is subject to some error due to the component estimated from survey data (which may or 
may not be reflected in our confidence interval), we also compute an “upper bound” estimate that 
suggests that the percentage of new enrollees with private health insurance at the time of 
enrollment was at most 27.1% during the April 2008-November 2009 period.  These results are 
presented in Table 2. 
We separately consider the “initial” post-expansion period (February and March 2008) 
because of the auto-enrollment and initial large jump in enrollment that occurred with program 
launch.  The percentage of new enrollees in those two months that had private health insurance at 
the time of enrollment was substantially higher – we estimate that percentage to be 33.2% (95% 
CI [31.9%, 34.4%]). 
                                                            
13 All reported confidence intervals are 95% normal bootstrap confidence intervals from at least 300 replications. 
Percentile and bias-corrected confidence intervals are very similar and not reported here. Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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The percentage of enrollees with private health insurance at the time of enrollment was 
lower prior to the program expansion (January 2006-January 2008).  We estimate this percentage 
to be 17.3%, (95% CI, [16.1%, 18.4%]).  We believe the increase in crowd-out is simply due to 
the effects of the recession, which began in December 2007. 
Table 2 also presents these results stratified by poverty level and by whether the county 
of residence was urban (defined as Milwaukee, Waukesha, or Dane counties) or rural (all other 
counties).  The time patterns discussed above hold generally for the subgroups as well.  Higher 
percentages of enrollees living in families with higher incomes as a percentage of the federal 
poverty level had access to private insurance at the time of enrollment.  Enrollees living in urban 
as opposed to rural counties were slightly more likely to have access to private insurance.  Table 
4 presents sample sizes for each cell. 
In order to compute the estimates of ESI coverage for those with a case member 
employed at a DOL firm, we use the estimates from the health insurance model, described above, 
to predict the probability of a worker having private health insurance conditional upon his or her 
employment status.  This model is described in the Appendix and its results are reported in 
Appendix Table A2. Overall, and despite slightly different models, we estimate very similar ESI 
offerings using both the FHS data and the CPS data.  Both the CPS and the FHS estimates 
suggest that 42% of enrollees with a case member who worked for a firm with a self-funded plan 
have ESI.  Results reported here were calculated using the CPS. 
Because our estimates rely on two very different sources of data – the TPL data for those 
with coverage through non-self-funded insurance plans and the DOL data and survey data from 
the CPS for those with coverage through self-funded plans, we separate the sources of the 
estimates into these two components in Table 3. For example, of the 19.9% of new enrollees Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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between April 2008 and May 2009 that we estimate to have access to private health insurance, 
16.3 percentage points had access via a non-self-funded plan (TPL) while we estimate 3.6 
percentage points had access through a self-funded plan. 
We also calculated these figures separately for children and adults, although we do not 
report them here because they did not appreciably differ from one another.  This is perhaps not 
surprising because the adults in this study are parents (or caretaker relatives), and children tend 
to have the same sources of private coverage as their parents. Gruber and Simon (2008) conclude 
that the crowd-out rate is close to 60% if the estimate is computed at the family level, and is 
roughly 30% when computed at the individual level. We have also performed this estimation at 
the case level rather than the individual level, using the first month that anyone the in the case 
was enrolled and the employment status of the highest earner on the case and did not find any 
important differences.  We think this is because we observe directly the insurance liability of the 
enrollee, and not just information on the policies held as one would typically find in survey data.  
However, we are measuring crowd-out conditional on enrolling in public insurance, so we do not 
consider those situations in which, for example, a father drops his own insurance coverage and 
goes uninsured once Medicaid covers his dependents.    
In order to estimate an upper bound for the percentage of newly enrolled cases with 
access to employer sponsored health insurance at the time they enrolled in BC+, we assume that 
all enrollees with a case member working at self-funded firms have ESI coverage.  The 
proportion of new enrollees with coverage indicated in the TPL is calculated as before.   This 
yields an “upper bound” estimate of 28% for all new enrollees in the post-expansion period.  
That is, we are highly confident that the percent of cases with ESI at the time of enrollment is 
lower than 28%.   Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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This is calculated under the assumption that all persons employed at self-funded firms do 
actually have access.  This is a strong assumption, given that we are unsure of a worker’s part-
time or full-time status at these firms or whether the firms offer insurance to all workers or just to 
management.  However, obtaining this number from such strong assumptions makes us confident 
that it is indeed an upper bound.  In particular, our upper bound rules out many of the larger 
estimates in the literature.  Calculated by time period, we find that a maximum of 44%, 47%, and 
40% had ESI coverage for the pre-, reform, and post-periods, respectively.  
 
B. Percentage of Enrollees that Dropped Private Coverage 
 
We estimate that overall, only 8.4% (95% CI, [7.5%, 9.2%]) of enrollees in the April 
2008-November 2009 period dropped private coverage within seven months of enrollment. 
Moreover, the upper-bound estimate suggests that this percentage was less than 15.6%.  This 
percentage was only slightly higher in the transitional period – 9.2% (95% CI, [8.3%, 10.1%]) – 
and was lower in the pre- period – 6.5% (95% CI, [5.8%, 7.3%]).  These estimates are reported 
in Table 4. 
These estimates of the percentage of enrollees who dropped their private coverage are 
low compared with estimates from the previous literature.  As with the estimates of the 
percentage of enrollees with access to private coverage at the time of enrollment, the estimates of 
the percentage that dropped private coverage are higher for those individuals in families with 
higher incomes as a percentage of FPL and are slightly higher for those enrollees who reside in 
urban counties. The estimates are also very similar when estimated separately for children and 
for parents, although we do not report these results here. 
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C. Results from Survey Data 
To see how the introduction of BC+ in February 2008 affected aggregate health insurance 
coverage, we used the 2007-2010 CPS (referring to calendar years 2006-2009).  Wisconsin 
children are eligible for BC+ subject to premium requirements, but since BC+ may have a larger 
effect on lower-income households, and we find that in practice very few households above 
300% FPL participate in the program, we restrict the sample to households below 300% FPL.  
To provide context for the CPS analysis, we first compared public health insurance 
program counts in the CPS to those from our administrative data. Using the CPS to calculate the 
number of Wisconsin residents under 65 who were either children or lived with a dependent 
child and who had Medicaid at some point during the previous year indicates that there were 
577,589 enrollees in 2006; 557,341 in 2007; 638,422 in 2008; and 649,445 in 2009.  These 
estimated levels of enrollment from the CPS are different from what are reported in our 
administrative data.  In contrast to national estimates of large-scale CPS Medicaid undercount 
(see, for example, Davern et al. 2009), we find that for all but one year CPS estimates yield a 
markedly higher count than the BC+ administrative data. The 12-month average of enrollment 
was 504,750 in the 2006 administrative data; 512,500 in 2007; 577,700 in 2008; and 657,800 in 
2009.  The estimated increase in enrollment according to the CPS also exceeded the increase in 
enrollment according to administrative data.  The CPS suggests an increase of 81,000 people 
between 2007 and 2008, which is much larger than the difference in the average number of 
enrollees in 2007 and 2008 from our administrative data, which was 65,200. 
  In Table 5, we report the estimates from equation (3) and (4) using the CPS.  Results for 
children are in the top panel while results for adults are in the bottom panel.  The table reports 
the coefficient on the interaction term (β3) and its standard error for each separate regression with Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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the dependent variables in rows and the control groups in columns.  The results show that, for all 
children, rates of public coverage increased by less in Wisconsin than in Minnesota, the rest of 
the Midwest, or the rest of the U.S, controlling for demographic characteristics of households.  
The standard errors on these estimates are quite large, however.  Rates of private coverage 
increased in Wisconsin relative to the control states, except for when compared to the whole U.S.  
The implied crowd-out rates for children range from 167% (when the Midwest is the control) to 
a crowd-in rate of 100% (when the rest of the U.S. are the control states). We also compute 
crowd-out rates in which we code anyone with both private and public coverage as having public 
only.  These rates are sometimes wrong signed for both children and adults.  Bootstrap bias-
corrected confidence intervals for the crowd-out ratios are reported in the table in parentheses.  
The confidence intervals are quite large in all cases, and never exclude zero.  This gives us little 
confidence in these results. 
   The discrepancy between these CPS results and the bounds from our administrative data 
are likely due to the small sample sizes in the CPS.  It may be that we have selected 
inappropriate control groups, especially given the economic downturn that was occurring in 
conjunction with this reform.  If the downturn hit Wisconsin harder than Minnesota, for example, 
this would confound our results. However, it is also possible that survey data would lead to 
systematically different estimates of crowd-out than would administrative data (because, for 
example, of known issues in Medicaid measurement).  The small sample sizes in the CPS (and 
resulting large standard errors) prevent us from saying anything definitive about any bias in 
estimates of crowd-out from survey data, only that it is unlikely to be precise when considering 
an expansion in just one state.  Overall, we believe that our estimates using administrative data Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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Our estimates, based primarily on administrative data, suggest that the expansions in 
Wisconsin’s BC+ program that took place in February 2008 did not lead to a substantial 
reduction in private insurance coverage.  We estimate that between April 2008 and May 2009, 
19.9% of enrollees had coverage from private health insurance at or around the time they entered 
BC+.  Of this percentage, 11.5 percentage points represent cases that we estimate kept private 
insurance coverage while on BC+ while the remaining 8.4 percent dropped this private coverage 
within 6 months. To obtain these estimates, we used a combination of administrative data 
sources along with survey data from the FHS and the CPS.  These estimates are more precise and 
credible than what one could obtain using survey data alone. 
  Our estimates are low compared with estimates from both Medicaid and CHIP 
expansions, which tend to be in the 25% to 50% range (CBO, 2007).  Moreover, they are low 
given that current state policy stipulates that all families below 150% FPL are eligible for BC+ 
regardless of whether they have access to ESI, and all families are eligible if they were required 
to pay more than 20% of the total premium associated with an employer’s plan.  The large 
increase in public coverage in response to the BC+ expansion, therefore, reduced the ranks of the 
uninsured or added secondary coverage to families with weak private coverage that elected to 
enroll. Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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  It should be noted that these estimates are low compared to those in the literature in part 
because they are based on panel data and do not include as crowd-out those uninsured 
individuals who move to public coverage but who, in the absence of the BC+ expansion, might 
have later moved to the “privately insured” state.  This is a limitation of using administrative 
panel data to construct these estimates.   
If the number of people on private insurance is reduced with increased public program 
eligibility, there are two possible mechanisms:  a decrease in the take-up of insurance by 
individuals, or a decrease in the offering of insurance by employers. Cutler and Gruber (1996) 
find that only the employee take-up margin is important, consistent with the negative results on 
firm offer rates of Shore-Sheppard et al. (2000) and Marquis and Long (2003).  We are unable to 
observe directly whether the individuals in our sample discontinue coverage voluntarily - take up 
public coverage in favor of an offer of private ESI- or because their employers cease to offer it. 
This is a general weakness of this literature. 
We do not claim to capture all dimensions of crowd-out.  Specifically, we focus on those 
individuals who actually enroll in Medicaid and had private insurance at the time of enrollment.  
If potential enrollees are able to use Medicaid as an implicit insurance plan, available when 
needed but not necessary to maintain active enrollment in, then we will understate the degree of 
crowd-out. In this sense, our estimates provide more of a lower bound.  We are also unable to 
account for anticipatory behavior, although much of our sample (all of those under 150% FPL in 
the post period) would have no eligibility incentive to drop private coverage and go uninsured 
prior to taking up Medicaid, as they face no premium cost for public program coverage.    
Despite these limits, this study has captured the actual number of Medicaid enrollees who 
substitute public coverage for private insurance and the number of those newly enrolled in the Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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expanded public program that come from the uninsured - a dimension that has not been 
previously understood. 
This analysis suggests that using administrative data can yield credible estimates of the 
fraction of public health insurance program enrollees that have access to private health insurance.  
Moreover, it suggests that, in contrast to some expectations, increases in public coverage in the 
post-CHIP era do not necessarily incur widespread substitution for private health insurance. 
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Appendix: CPS and FHS Samples and Health Insurance Models 
We report summary statistics or our FHS and CPS samples in Table A1. We also use 
both data sets to estimate probit models of health insurance coverage.  The predictors in the 
probit models include sex, age, geographic location, age of the youngest child in the family, 
educational level, self-employment status, occupational industry, firm size, earnings, and federal 
poverty level (FPL).  The FHS has fewer available covariates than the CPS.  See table A1 in 
appendix A for descriptive statistics on the CPS and FHS samples.  Except for FPL and age of 
the youngest child, all variables are employment or demographic characteristics of either the 
highest earner in a family (CPS) or the reference individual (FHS).  These variables were 
selected and constructed to match with the available information in administrative data.  The age 
of the highest earner is coded into 18-34, 35-54, and older than 54 years old (reference).   The 
educational level of the highest earner is coded into less than high school (reference), high school 
graduation or GED but no college education, and at least one year of college education.  The size 
of the employer is coded into a dichotomous variable, with less than 100 as the reference group.   
The yearly earnings of the highest earner are coded into less than $10,000, $10,000-$14,999, 
$15,000-19,999, $20,000-$29,999, and more than $30,000 (reference).   Earnings are inflated to 
2009 dollars using the CPI-U.  FPL is divided into 150% and less (reference), 151-200%, 201-
300%, and greater than 300%.  We use two indicators to identify the residential counties that are 
more diverse and highly urbanized: living in Dane county (mainly Madison) and living in 
Milwaukee or Waukesha counties.
14  We create a dichotomous indicator for the goods-producing 
industries, including agriculture/forestry, mining, construction and manufacturing industries in 
                                                            
14 We first intended to separate urban and rural residential areas.  Though CPS contains geographic 
information sufficient for our purpose, the administrative data only have residential county.  We thus 
created two indicators of urban counties in order to match both data sets.  We cannot separate Milwaukee 
from Waukesha in the CPS data.  Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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the major industry code.  Age of the youngest child is categorized into being younger than 6, 6-
12 (reference), and older than 12.  We also control for the survey years.  
  We use probit models to estimate the probability of having private insurance among 
workers.  Appendix table A2 shows the marginal effects from the probit models.  Since all 
variables are binary, the table reports the marginal effects of going from 0 to 1 for each.  We 
obtained similar results from the FHS and the CPS. Our results suggest that residential area, 
earnings, industry, firm size, educational level, and family poverty levels predict the probability 
of having private insurance well.  The workers from smaller firms and workers in non-goods 
producing industries are less likely to have health insurance.  Earning and FPL are positively 
associated with having health insurance.   The workers living in the two largest metropolitan 
counties in Wisconsin are more likely to have private insurance than those living in other areas.  
Self-employment is negatively associated with private insurance. 





Male  41.4%  43.0%  43.4% 
Dane County  5.8%  5.1%  5.6% 
Milwaukee County  26.6%  21.8%  23.4% 
Youngest child <= 5  63.3%  60.8%  61.5% 
Youngest child > 5 and <13  23.0%  27.7%  24.3% 
Youngest child 13‐18  13.7%  11.5%  14.2% 
Adult <34  85.6%  80.6%  82.5% 
Adult 34‐54  13.8%  18.1%  16.5% 
Adult 54‐65  0.6%  1.2%  1.0% 
Less than High School  71.2%  66.3%  74.1% 
High School Graduate  23.2%  26.8%  20.9% 
Some College  5.6%  6.9%  5.0% 
FPL <= 150%  93.1%  69.7%  81.2% 
FPL 151‐200%  6.7%  20.0%  13.8% 
FPL 201‐300%  0.2%  8.6%  4.1% 
FPL > 300%  0.0%  1.8%  0.9% 
Self Employed  27.0%  36.4%  28.8% 
Employed (UI match)  60.1%  70.7%  64.5% 
Of which: 
Goods Industry  7.7%  11.6%  9.6% 
Service Industry  92.3%  88.4%  90.4% 
Full Time  90.8%  94.4%  93.8% 
Part Time  9.2%  5.6%  6.2% 
Small (non‐DOL) Firm  76.1%  71.0%  73.0% 
Large (DOL) Firm  23.9%  29.0%  27.0% 









Jan 06 ‐ Jan 08  Feb 08 ‐ Mar 08  Apr 08 ‐ May 09  Jan 06 ‐ Jan 08  Feb 08 ‐ Mar 08  Apr 08 ‐ May 09 
All   17.3%  33.2%  19.9%  23.9%  40.2%  27.1% 
[.161, .184]  [.319, .344]  [.187, .210] 
By Poverty Level 
< 150  16.8%  29.4%  17.7%  23.4%  33.0%  20.7% 
[.157, .178]  [.182, .306]  [.167, .187] 
> 150  24.4%  41.8%  29.2%  30.6%  46.8%  36.0% 
[.230, .257]  [.405, .432]  [.278, .306] 
150‐200  23.9%  42.4%  27.6%  30.3%  49.1%  35.6% 
[.227, .252]  [.408, .439]  [.261, .292] 
200‐300  37.8%  41.0%  32.9%  40.2%  42.9%  36.6% 
[.370, .387]  [.397, .423]  [.317, .341] 
300+  35.0%  39.7%  37.0%  36.9%  40.9%  39.0% 
[.342, .357]  [.378, .415]  [.356, .384] 
By County 
Urban  19.1%  35.1%  21.7%  25.9%  42.0%  29.0% 
[.177, .204]  [.338, .364]  [.206, .229] 
Rural  16.3%  32.0%  18.8%  22.8%  39.1%  25.9% 













Jan 06 ‐ Jan 08  Feb 08 ‐ Mar 08  Apr 08 ‐ May 09  Jan 06 ‐ Jan 08  Feb 08 ‐ Mar 08  Apr 08 ‐ May 09 
All   17.3%  33.2%  19.9%  23.9%  40.2%  27.1% 
By source 
TPL  14.0%  29.5%  16.3%  14.0%  29.5%  16.3% 





Jan 06 ‐ Jan 08  Feb 08 ‐ Mar 08  Apr 08 ‐ May 09  Jan 06 ‐ Jan 08  Feb 08 ‐ Mar 08  Apr 08 ‐ May 09 
All   6.5%  9.2%  8.4%  13.1%  16.2%  15.6% 
By source 
TPL  3.2%  5.5%  4.8%  3.2%  5.5%  4.8% 
DOL / CPS  3.3%  3.7%  3.6%  10.0%  10.7%  10.7% 












Jan 06 ‐ Jan 08  Feb 08 ‐ Mar 08  Apr 08 ‐ May 09  Jan 06 ‐ Jan 08  Feb 08 ‐ Mar 08  Apr 08 ‐ May 09 
All   6.5%  9.2%  8.4%  13.1%  16.2%  15.6% 
[.058, .073]  [.083, .101]  [.075, .092] 
By Poverty Level 
< 150  6.3%  8.6%  7.3%  12.9%  12.2%  10.3% 
[.055, .072]  [.076, .096]  [.064, .082] 
> 150  9.3%  10.7%  12.9%  15.5%  15.7%  19.7% 
[.081, .106]  [.097, .117]  [.116, .142] 
150‐200  9.3%  11.0%  12.5%  15.7%  17.7%  20.5% 
[.082, .105]  [.098, .122]  [.110, .139] 
200‐300  9.5%  9.5%  12.9%  11.9%  11.4%  16.6% 
[.089, .102]  [.090, .100]  [.121, .137] 
300+  10.6%  13.3%  20.0%  12.5%  14.5%  22.0% 
[.099, .112]  [.125, .141]  [.191, .211] 
By County 
Urban  7.2%  10.2%  9.2%  14.0%  17.1%  16.5% 
[.063, .081]  [.093, .111]  [.082, .101] 
Rural  6.2%  8.7%  7.9%  12.7%  15.8%  15.0% 













MN  MIDW  U.S.  MN  MIDW  U.S. 
Public/Both ‐ 0.058 ‐ 0.034 ‐ 0.034 
[0.043]  [0.033]  [0.031] 
Private  0.017  0.022 ‐ 0.002  ‐0.29 ‐ 0.65  0.06 
[0.042]  [0.032]  [0.043]  (‐.89, 3.61)  (‐2.09, 2.22)  (‐2.38, 9.01) 
Private/Both  0.061  0.057  0.034  ‐1.05 ‐ 1.68 ‐ 1 
[0.043]  [0.034]  [0.032]  (‐3.26, .15)  (‐14.11, .15)  (‐7.31, .723) 
Uninsured  0.041  0.012  0.032 
[0.026]  [0.018]  [0.017] 
Sample Size  5606  19112  149619 
Panel B. Parents/Caretakers 
Difference‐in‐difference  Crowdout Ratio  
MN  MIDW  U.S.  MN  MIDW  U.S. 
Public/Both ‐ 0.041 ‐ 0.037 ‐ 0.01 
[0.038]  [0.029]  [0.027] 
Private ‐ 0.002  0.025 ‐ 0.002  0.05 ‐ 0.68  0.2 
[0.042]  [0.032]  [0.030]  (‐2.85, 20.11)  (‐2.76, 2.58)  (‐1.52, 206) 
Private/Both  0.006  0.031  0.005  ‐0.15 ‐ 0.84 ‐ 0.5 
[0.042]  [0.032]  [0.030]  (‐2.87, 13.42)  (‐5.76, 1.62)  (‐8.72, 9.69) 
Uninsured  0.042  0.013  0.012 
[0.032]  [0.023]  [0.021] 
























































Adult <34 ‐   ‐ 0.059 
‐  [0.044] 
Adult 34‐54 ‐   ‐ 0.015 
‐  [0.042] 
Earnings <10k ‐   ‐ 0.306** 
‐  [0.062] 
Earnings 10‐15k ‐   ‐ 0.191** 
‐  [0.045] 
Earnings 15‐20k ‐   ‐ 0.123** 
‐  [0.037] 




















Observations  2016  2685 Estimates of Crowd-Out from Administrative Data   
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Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. This table 
shows the marginal effects from probit models in the two survey data 
sets used to predict the probability of private insurance over the 
administrative data in the calculation of equation 1,  the 2007 and 
2008 Wisconsin Family Health Surveys (FHS) and the 2007‐2010 
Current Population Surveys (CPS). Not all variables were available in 
both surveys.  Unavailable variables are indicated by a dash. Details of 
sample and variable construction are available in the text. 
 